# Computable gas bounds: routing that cannot be gas-bombed

> Canonical: https://blazephoenix.xyz/learn/computable-gas-bounds
> License: CC BY 4.0 (attribution + link) · © 2026 BlazePhoenix
> Updated: 2026-08-05



BlazePhoenix V2 is pre-deployment and under audit; this is the specified design. A route that touches attacker-influenced code can be made to burn arbitrary gas — a hostile hook or a pathological pool can turn a cheap swap into a failed, expensive one. The gas-bounds primitive gives every step a computable upper limit before it runs.

## Bounding before executing

Because the router simulates the plan on chain first, it can attach a worst-case gas estimate to each leg and refuse or reprice a plan whose bound exceeds what the user authorised. Costs become predictable and denial-of-service by gas exhaustion stops being free for an attacker. The bound is derived, not guessed, so it holds even against pools the router has never seen.

**Verify it yourself:** Call previewPlan and read the gas estimate it returns; a plan whose real cost exceeds its stated bound is exactly what the primitive is designed to reject

Related: https://blazephoenix.xyz/learn/transient-storage · https://blazephoenix.xyz/learn/eightfold-dispatcher · https://blazephoenix.xyz/learn/v2-redesign-overview